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A study of the contrast in the American and British approaches to
the resolution of problems in substantive criminal law provides one
method for judging the quality of justice inherent in the application of
a given law. This article examines specifically the mistake of fact de-
fense 1 and its disparate treatment under these two systems of justice.
The British approach is to retain a subjective element in the mistake
of fact defense, while American courts impose an objective "reason-
ableness" requirement.
The British method amounts to a logical clarification of the mistake
of fact defense. In contrast, the American method constitutes judicial
intervention into substantive criminal law.
It might be expected that American courts would favor the defend-
ant by allowing him, for constitutional reasons, the benefit of the
doubt. However, it is the British House of Lords that seems to have
resolved the particular problem of mistake of fact without the advan-
tage of the due process clause. An examination of the two different
types of analysis will lead the reader to the same conclusion-that
the reasonableness requirement has no place in the mistake of fact
defense in criminal law. The substantive criminal law approach, utiliz-
ing the concept of mens rea, will be discussed first, and will be fol-
lowed by a treatment of recent American constitutional developments
in the area of burden of proof standards in their criminal context.
* B.A., Duke University, 1970; J.D., Seton Hall School of Law, 1973; member
of the Bar in the State of New Jersey and in the District of Columbia; Assistant
Professor of Law, International School of Law.
1. The author's research was guided by the organization and thoughtfulness of
the authors of S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (3d
ed. 1975), and by the vital work of Glanville Williams, principally in G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961).
GEORGE MASON SCHOOL OF LAW
Finally, two factually similar rape cases, one British and one Ameri-
can, will be analyzed to show the present contrasting results when
the same problem is presented. Some suggestions for legislative or
judicial reform will follow.
I. THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW-Mens Rea
Criminal law as a whole can easily be grasped once the concept of
mens rea, the mental element of a crime, is mastered. 2 The unifying
principle is that no person should be subjected to the unique sanc-
tions of criminal punishment unless found to be morally blameworthy
or culpable 3-that is, unless he (or she) has performed a voluntary
act while possessing a guilty mind or mens rea.
2. Williams explains the necessity for the requirement of mens rea in terms of
the various common rationales for the imposition of punishment when he writes:
It may be said that any theory of criminal punishment leads to a requirement of
some kind of mens rea. The deterrent theory is workable only if the culprit has
knowledge of the legal sanction; and if a man does not foresee the consequence
of his act he cannot appreciate that punishment lies in store for him if he does
it. The retributive theory presupposes moral guilt; incapacitation suggests social
danger; and the reformative aim is out of place if the offender's sense of values
is not warped.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 30. See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 252 (1952).
3. It is this element of blameworthiness that separates the criminal from the
mere tortfeasor or contract breaker. Although the same amount of harm might be
forthcoming in a given situation, the so-called vicious mind distinguishes the criminal
offender. As Sir Patrick Devlin explains it:
The notion of mens rea meant that in considering the gravity of the crime, it
became necessary to take into account not only the act and its consequences but
also the degree of blameworthiness with which the offender acted, that is, the
intent to which he denied or apprehended the consequences of the act.
Devlin, Criminal Responsibility and Punishment, Function of Judge and Jury, 1954
CRIM. L. REV. 661, 662. See also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
31 (1968); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 103-08 (1968); G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 30-31.
The same thought often appears as the Latin maxim: Aetas no facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6, 107 (1641). See generally Dubin, Mens Rea Re-
considered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 322, 351 n.126 (1966).
There has for some time been an exeption from this requirement of evil intent for
so-called "public welfare offenses." Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 73, 84 (1933), originated the phrase:
We do not go with Blackstone in saying that "a vicious will" is necessary to
constitute a crime, 4 BI. Comm. *21, for conduct alone without regard to the
intent of the doer is often sufficient. There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to
declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its
definition. But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive-mere failure
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The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when in-
flicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual
to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental ele-
ment and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
child's familiar exculpatory "but I didn't mean to." 4
Because of this culpability requirement, two questions posed in
every criminal case must be answered affirmatively before a guilty
verdict can be reached: did defendant break a law because he per-
formed a voluntary act 5 (whether or not harmful consequences were
to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under cir-
cumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed. Cf.
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57; United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
4. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952). In Morissette, de-
fendant's conviction for stealing government property, spent bomb casings, which he
thought had been abandoned by the Air Force, was reversed despite the fact that the
federal theft statute did not mention an intent requirement. The Court found that
when a statute was merely a codification of the common law, the traditional intent
requirement would be read into it absent a contrary legislative intent.
5. Cases in which a conviction was reversed because the appellate court could
find no voluntary act include People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr.
394 (1970) (automatism, murder conviction reversed because of defendant's prior
gunshot wound); People v. Grant, 4 I11. App. 3d 125, 360 N.E.2d 809 (1977) (au-
tomatism due to defendant's psychomotor epilepsy); Bratty v. Attorney-General,
[1962] A.C. 386, 409-10 (defendant sought defense to traffic violation based on au-
tomatism caused by psychomotor epilepsy); Kilbride v. Lake, [1962] N.Z.L.R. 590
(wind blew inspection sticker from windshield of car; defendant ticketed before he
knew of its absence or had a chance to replace it). The Model Penal Code carries a
requirement of a voluntary act in § 2.01 (proposed official draft) which it explains in
terms of the futility of punishing an involuntary act.
That penal sanctions can not be employed with justice unless requirements
are satisfied seems wholly clear. The law can not hope to deter involuntary
movement or to stimulate action that can not physically be performed; the sense
of personal security would be short lived in a society where such movement or
inactivity could lead to formal social condemnation of the sort that a conviction
necessarily entails. People whose involuntary movements threaten harml to
others may present a public health or safety problem, calling for therapy or
even for custodial commitment; they do not present a problem of correction.
These are axioms under the present law, though dealt with only indi-
rectly by our penal legislation in the states where legislation touches the
subject at all.
Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) at 119.
1978]
GEORGE MASON SCHOOL OF LAW[
caused thereby); 6 and, did he possess the state of mind expressed or
implied by the statute that would indicate culpability? 7
A principle to which we will return later in this article is that gen-
erally, the most serious offenses require a greater degree of
blameworthiness, manifesting a greater depth of intent or purpose on
the part of the actor.8 The major exception is felony murder, first
degree in many states, where the intent is implied from the inten-
tional participation in the very serious underlying felony. 9 This
greater degree of intent, confusingly described as specific intent, 10
requires that the actor not only intend an action criminal in itself,
(e.g., breaking into a building), but also that he have a further or
6. It seems that in some cases, "harm" may often be merely an affront to an
overly scrupulous morality. This is the category of offenses sometimes referred to as
"victimless crimes."
See Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497. See also Kadish, The Crisis
of Overcriminalization, 372 ANNALS 157 (1967); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 266-67 (1968); Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE
L.J. 662 (1962); P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4-6 (1963); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (London ed.
1913); J. STEPHENS, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1872); MODEL PENAL CODE,
Comments to Article 207.5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
7. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952), the Court
suggests that the mens rea concept was so fundamental to American's "intense indi-
vidualism," that eventually it became an unstated requirement of every criminal stat-
ute. "Courts with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the require-
ment as to offenses that were taken over from the common law."
8. For example, in Morissette, where defendant's conviction for stealing empty
bomb casings was reversed by the Supreme Court, the Court distinguished between
the so called public welfare offenses, see note 3 supra, and the more serious common
law crime of larceny. 342 U.S. at 260.
Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents were among the earliest
offenses known to the law that existed before legislation; they are invasions of
rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and
arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when a sufficient
amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitand, is
"... as bad a word as you can give to man or thing." quoting from 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (1899).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1975); State v.
Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 217, 117 P. 58, 61 (1911). See generally Michaels & Wechsler,
A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 704, 713-17 (1937). Cf.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
10. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) ("the variety, disparity,
and confusion" of the "requisite but elusive mental element"). See generally J. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960); SMITH & HOGAN,
CRIMINAL LAW 47 (3d ed. 1973); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, § 21
at 49.
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specific criminal purpose (e.g., to commit a felony inside the build-
ing, or burglary)."
Because it serves to negate the mens rea required by nearly every
criminal offense, 12 mistake of fact is an important defense to a crimi-
nal charge. The Model Penal Code defines the mistake of fact defense
as follows:
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge,
belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material
element of the offense; or
(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such
ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.13
Once again, the reason for the defense is explained in terms of the
more general requirements of the mens rea doctrine of establishing
blameworthiness:
To understand the rational of ignorantia facti excusat, it is necessary to
recognize and take account of the relevant ethical principle, namely,
moral obligation is determined not by the actual facts but by the actor's
opinion regarding them. 
14
Mistake of fact situations include those where, for example, defend-
ant did not know what he was doing was wrong, becuase he thought
the property he took was abandoned 15 or his own, or because he
thought the house he was entering was his (identical house). Even
when defendant's mistake was caused by his intoxication by drugs or
11. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618
(1969).
12. The only exceptions would be the public welfare offenses, see note 3 supra,
and cases of criminal negligence. The Model Penal Code describes cases where mens
rea may be negated in § 2.02(2)(b):
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant cir-
cumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of the nature or that such cir-
cumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
This is also called a "general intent" crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 204(1).
13. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1973); Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in
Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1957).
14. Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, supra note 13, at 3. Aristotle,
according to Hall, thought of behavior in ignorance of the facts as involuntary. Id. at
4. See also 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1736).
15. This was apparently the situation in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952), where defendant picked up spent bomb casings thinking the Air Force
had abandoned them. For a general discussion of examples of mistake of fact, see G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at ch. 5, pp. 140 ff.; § 70 at 199.
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alcohol, 16 his actions will be excused in crimes where specific intent,
or the further criminal purpose is required. 17
II. EXTERNAL STANDARDS IN CRIMINAL LAW-THE
"REASONABLENESS" REQUIREMENT
The approach outlined above is described as a subjective approach,
i.e., defendant's guilt or innocence is determined by what he actually
thought or perceived. Subjectivism is a pervasive element in crimi-
nal, as opposed to civil law. An anomaly has crept into this picture,
stemming, as so many common law traditions do, from the influence
of the legal realists, among them Justice Holmes. Holmes wrote in
his chapter on the criminal law in The Common Law that external
standards "independent of the degree of evil in the particular person's
motives or intentions," were to be expected where the law was re-
sponsible for establishing guidelines for conduct which would give
rise to liability.' 8 Holmes went on to distinguish criminal liability
from liability in tort. He acknowledged the fact that external stan-
dards of conduct are more easily imposed in the field of torts than in
criminal law, where intent plays a far more important role. 19
Nevertheless, his drive to establish external standards of conduct in
criminal law, in the interests of community safety, evolved into the
objective standard of "reasonableness" manifested in his opinion in
Commonwealth v. Pierce.20  In that case, defendant, a physician who
16. For examples where voluntary intoxication led to an excusable mistake, see
People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969) (assault with
intent to kill); State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972) (first degree murder);
Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975) (armed robbery). See
generally Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1049 (1944).
17. See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967) (armed robbery,
felony murder). For a discussion of the meaning of specific intent, see notes 8-11
supra, and accompanying text.
18. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43 (Howe ed. 1963).
19. Holmes notes that criminal liability is founded on blameworthiness, and that
"a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear." Id.
(emphasis added). Holmes' objective, or reasonable man approach can clearly be con-
trasted with more recent opinions, such as that of a student author writing in 1972,
which distinguishes between the fault required in civil cases, where the issue is com-
pensation, and the standard in criminal cases, where punishment is possible and "a
conscious choice by the defendant" should be required. Comment, Negligence and
the General Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 81 YALE L.J. 949, 977 (1972). See
generally, Hall, The Interrelationship of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 967 (1943).
20. 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
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had wrapped a female patient in kerosene-soaked clothes in an at-
tempt to cure her, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter when
she died. The Court upheld the conviction although the defendant
had acted without knowledge of a risk, and with his patient's con-
sent. 21 The Pierce opinion established the precedent that mistakes of
fact need not only be real, but also "reasonable" in order to excuse
liability. 22 This appears to run counter to the general, and growing,
notion that guilt ought to be determined subjectively, that is, based
upon what the defendant actually thought when he committed the
21. 1d. at 178. Since a reasonable person would not have acted as defendant did,
he was liable for involuntary manslaughter, although usually a state of mind more
akin to recklessness, or disregard of a known risk is required.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 445, 16 C.M.R. 11, 19
(1954); McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 774, 775 (1888).
If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the conduct of the prosecutrix was
such towards the defendant, at the time of the alleged rape, as to create in the
mind of the defendant the honest and reasonable belief that she had consented,
or was willing for the defendant to have connection with her, they must acquit
the defendant.
There are other manifestations of the objective standard including the partial de-
fense of provocation, which must be of such a nature as to provoke the "reasonable"
man. See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862); Bedder v. D.P.P. [1854] All E.R.
801; Mancini's Case, [1944] A.C. 1; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 9-2 (Smith-Hurd Cum.
Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (West 1963); Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6
ELIz. 2, c. 11, pts. 1, 3; Michaels & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 1241, 1281-82 (1937). Cf. Williams, Provocation and the Reason-
able Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney
1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b). If the defendant makes a mistake as to the
provoking person, the objective test does not hold, for his mistake need not be
reasonable. State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 A. 37 (1901); Williams, supra note 1, at
752.
Another example is the complete defense of self-defense. It requires that the con-
duct of another be sufficient both to raise the fear of death or grievous bodily harm
and to identify the same to a reasonable man. See, e.g., Barger v. State, 235 Md.
556, 202 A.2d 344 (1964); Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y.L. 193, 41 Am. Dec. 283 (1849);
Palmer v. R., [1971] 1 All E.R. 1077; 55 Crim. App. 223, 241 (1971). Cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.01(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1959).
A final example is defense of another, see, e.g., State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super.
479, 512, 174 A.2d 506 (1961). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.15 (1) (McKinney, amended 1968):
A person may ... use physical force upon another person when and to the
extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third
person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of
unlawful physical force by such other person.
A British article suggests that this reasonableness requirement be justified as a "spe-
cial excuse" that is not an element the state is required to prove. Sellers, Mens Rea
and the Judicial Approach to "Bad Excuses in Criminal Law," 41 MOD. L. REV. 245
(1978).
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crime. 23  To defeat a mistake of fact defense in American law, it is
only necessary for the state to prove that a reasonable tan would not
have made (or should not have made) the mistake, 24 obviously a
much easier task for the state than having to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant did not in fact make the mistake.
It might be argued that the "reasonableness" requirement is an
attempt to circumscribe the degree of deviation from the norm that
the society will tolerate. 25  As such the requirement is appropriate,
23. The movement towards increased subjectivity in criminal law is illustrated
clearly in the case law of Pennsylvania. Compare Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa.
525, 534-36, 194 A.2d 911, 916 (1963) with Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa.
382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972) (diminished capacity); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa.
596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949); with Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218,
261 A.2d 550 (1970) (felony murder); and note the discussion in Commonwealth v.
Root, 403 Pa. 571, 576, 170 A.2d 310, 312 (1961) (causation):
Legal theory which makes guilt or innocence of criminal homicide depend
upon such accidental and fortuitous circumstances as are now embraced by
modern tort law's encompassing concept of proximate cause is too harsh to be
just.
Pennsylvania simultaneously has been faced with the problem of meeting the con-
stitutional standards enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, see notes 58-61 infra, and
accompanying text. The developments have gone on independently, resulting in the
anomaly that in a state where objectivity is apparently becoming less and less preva-
lent, defendant must raise insanity as an affirmative defense. Commonwealth v.
Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977). The burden of disproving self-defense
remains on the prosecution once the issue has been duly raised. Self-defense "ne-
gates specific elements of the crime of murder as it existed in this state at common
law, i.e., unlawfulness and malice, and it is in contravention of the United States
Constitution, . . to require a criminal defendant to carry a burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence concerning this defense." Commonwealth v. Hilbert,
476 Pa. 288, 301, 382 A.2d 724, 731 (1978).
Pennsylvania, in 1973, adopted a new criminal code including a section patterned
after MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (mistake of fact). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 304,
(Purdon 1973).
Jerome Hall writes in Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, supra note 13, at
7-8, that absent any showing of insanity, feeblemindedness, etc., a defendant's nor-
mality is assumed. Since the jury cannot see into his mind, what a reasonable person
would have thought obviously has some bearing on what defendant probably thought.
Hall goes on to say, however, that the use of the reasonableness standard as an
external (objective) standard of liability is objectionable because "some defendants are
inexperienced or awkward or, for other causes, are not reasonable ('normal') per-
sons," although they do not fall within the legal definition of incompetence.
See also Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Respon-
sibility: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility and the Like, 62 J. CaiM.
L.C. & P.S. 313 (1971); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 731 (1960); HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1968); C. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 123. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04,
Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
24. United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 445, 16 C.M.R. 11, 19 (1954); Hill v.
State, 194 Ala. 11, 23, 69 So. 941, 946 (1915).
25. Cf. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 47-48 (1970).
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since criminal law is at least partially an instrument of social control
for the common benefit. 26  But the approach fails to note the differ-
ence between the morally deviant and the person who is merely less
intelligent or perceptive than the norm. No one would argue success-
fully that the morally deviant ought to be tolerated. 27  However, it is
difficult to fit the blissfully and unreasonably ignorant into the same
category. It is punishment for a status, and even the Supreme Court
has written that it is wrong to punish anyone for "being a leper" or
"having a common cold." 28  In such cases it seems inappropriate to
use criminal punishment as opposed to treatment in some institution
where the defendant could be educated, or treated for his deficien-
cies. 2 9
It is arguably wrong for a society to use a conviction, with its at-
tendant social stigma, to gain control over an offender whose fault lies
not in his judgment as to whether an act was wrong, but in his mis-
take concerning the nature of the act itself. 30 The American national
philosophy is hinged on the widest possible tolerance of deviation
from the norm, hence the emphasis on freedom of speech to encour-
age a "marketplace of ideas," and the use of federalism to allow
greater latitude in self-government. 31 American law should not
abridge the individual's "right to be different" 32 when he is not mor-
ally at fault.
The problems with the American approach to mistake of fact can
perhaps best be explained through a series of pictorial representa-
tions.
In an idealized criminal trial situation involving mistake of fact, all
those who were in fact guilty would be found guilty, while no one
innocent would be convicted. This state of affairs is represented by
Diagram A. In a real world situation, things are not so perfect, which
is the reason for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test. The situation
would approach Diagram B where a few of those who are innocent
26. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(a) (Proposed official draft, 1962), Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 1973, S.1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., § l-1a2 (1973).
27. See, e.g., the limitation on the sociopathic or psychopathic offender who
might otherwise meet the Model Penal Code insanity defense. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01(2). But see the opinion of Judge Bazelon, dissenting in United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
28. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). See notes 80-81 infra.
29. For a similar suggestion, see Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law,
supra note 13, at 11.
30. Cf. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforc-
ing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 436 (1963).
31. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. W. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1972).
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would be convicted while others, who are guilty, would go free. With
the present view of mistake of fact, there are far more findings of
guilt, but more innocent people are convicted in the process (Dia-
gram C). Obviously other considerations leading to acquittals are not
considered in any of the illustrations that follow.








Cross-hatched area indicates persons found guilty.
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In American jurisdictions, where the "reasonable" mistake standard
prevails, the State is in effect required only to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that (1) the harm done was caused by the defen-
dant's voluntary act, and (2) a reasonable man would not have thought
things were as defendant alleges he thought them to be. All these
''reasonable" requirements seem to fly in the face of a system that
purports to punish on the basis of guilt or individual culpability
alone. 33 Thus, the reasonableness requirement of mistake of fact
serves to undermine the function of the requirements that mens rea
be proved and that the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt. That function is simply to reduce
the probability that an individual who is not guilty will be convicted.
The Supreme Court, in a case to be discussed at length in the pages
that follow, appears to be unwilling to accept such an increase in the
chances of an error to defendant's detriment.
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact
finding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party
has a stake in an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defen-
dant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the pro-
cess of placing on the other party the burden of ... persuading the fact
finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 34
This additional burden upon the defendant, which seems unsupport-
able either in terms of logic or justice, is made still less defensible in
the American system by a series of Constitutional decisions made by
the Supreme Court.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE REASONABLENESS
REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW
The Court has made very few forays into the field of substantive
criminal law, 35 perhaps because this area has been relegated to the
33. Professor Jerome Hall calls this "a complete repudiation of the underlying
policy." Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, supra note 13, at 5-6.
34. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting from Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)) (emphasis added). The Court in Winship further noted,
"To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the fact in
issue.' " 397 U.S. at 364 (quoting in part Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the
Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. No. 4, 1, 26 (1967)). Winship and its progeny
are discussed at notes 52-58, infra, and accompanying text.
35. For a lucid description of most of them, see Packer, Mens Rea and the Su-
preme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107.
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political branches under the doctrine of separation of powers, 3 6 or to
the states under the tenth amendment.3 7
Justice Marshall wrote:
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of
interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has
utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antiso-
cial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake,
justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a con-
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of
the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical and medi-
cal views of the nature of the man. This process of adjustment has al-
ways been thought to be the province of the States.3 8
The exceptions to this rule, understandably, have come at points
where the substantive criminal law has inexorably conflicted with the
Constitution.3 9 Thus, during an era of judicial activism, when the
Supreme Court engaged more freely in what is called substantive due
process, it also elected to rule on the propriety of convictions ob-
tained under statutes, primarily in the economic arena, which dis-
pensed in whole or in part with mens rea. 40 These statutes were
36. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J., dis-
senting):
Such an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to
make laws, not of the power to interpret them. The use by federal courts of
such a formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto federal or state laws simply takes
away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own
judgment of fairness and wisdom and transfers that power to this Court for
ultimate determination-a power which was specifically denied to federal courts
by the convention that framed the Constitution.
37. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968).
38. Id. at 535-36. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946) (District
of Columbia Court of Appeals permitted to disallow "diminshed capacity" defense as
a matter of local law); and the most recent decision of Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
39. The Court has had the power of judicial review since the decision of Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. Each opinion during this period upheld the statute in question. United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (criminal penalties for adulterated or mislabelled
drugs); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (criminal penalties
for trespass onto government timber lands). Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (1943) (post "substantive due process," "economic offense" allowing strict
and vicarious criminal liability for a drug wholesaler); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957) (post "substantive due process" case requiring mens rea where defendant's
failure to register as a convicted felon was deemed "passive" conduct. These opinions
are criticized in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1967). For a
more recent case on the same theme, see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
(public welfare statute upheld despite strict liability element in case involving rodents
in supermarket chain's warehouse).
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challenged as violative of due process, but were upheld where they
involved the "public welfare" because the fact of doing business put
the defendants on notice that if harm occurred, they might be held
responsible. 4'
Recently, members of the Court 42 as well as commentators 43 have
criticized what they believe to be a return to substantive due process.
The Supreme Court, however, has again examined and upheld a stat-
ute alleged to create culpability on the part of the defendant who did
not possess intent. In United States v. Feola,44 the Court faced a
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 111, 45 which eliminated a requirement that
the defendant have knowledge of surrounding circumstances. Its
reasoning, strikingly similar to that of the substantive due process era
justices discussed above, was that once the defendants embarked on a
41. See discussion of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943).
42. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975) (opinion of the
Court, criticizing application of "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine in social security
widower's benefit case); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973) (Opinion of the Court in equal protection case involving challenge to property
tax basis of school financing); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 182
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (equal protection challenge to compensation for illegiti-
mates); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(criticizing use of due process rather than equal protection in case involving filing
fees for indigents seeking divorces); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (due process challenge to statute forbidding sale on use
of contraceptives). Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggests return of substantive due process through use by
Court of tenth amendment restrictions on commerce clause powers of Congress in
local government questioning of federal environmental control); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), (distinguishing this equal
protection case where the necessitites of life in the form of a welfare ceiling were
involved from the era of judicial activism in the economic arena).
43. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Re-
turn of the "Natural-Law-Due Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716, (1969);
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things For-
gotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965).
44. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) provides in part that,
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Feola was convicted of violating § 111 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (conspiracy). He
argued that he should not have been convicted under either statute since he did not
know that the victims of the assault in question were federal officers. 420 U.S. at
675. If his view had been accepted, he would simply have been guilty of a state
offense of simple assault, rather than the violation of § 111, which carries heavy
penalties. Id. at 683.
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criminal enterprise, in this case assaults on what they thought were
prospective drug purchasers, they might be found guilty of assault on
the federal officers who were posing as purchasers. 46
In addition to the direct attack on the mens rea requirements, the
Court has considered the propriety of punishment for persons who
arguably could not entertain the intent required for conviction.4 7 The
Supreme Court, in Robinson v. California,48 found that the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
prohibited punishment of a drug addict for the status, or illness, of
being an addict.4 9  The Court, however, rejected a claim in a later
case that actions resulting from alcoholism or its symptoms, as op-
posed to the status of having the illness itself, were also protected
from punishment. 50
The most recent constitutional challenges to criminal statutes have
been based upon the burden of proof required by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 51 In In re Winship 52 the Court
found that due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every element of an offense. 53  Winship was extended in Mullaney v.
46. Id. at 684. The Court went on to consider the intent required for conviction
of conspiracy to violate § 111. Obviously in this case the enterprise was criminal
rather than commercial, as in the cases noted previously, note 40 supra.
47. These people would therefore lack the volitional (will) element of mens rea,
as opposed to the cognitive (knowledge) element that was involved in Feola.
48. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
49. Id. at 666. The Court distinguishes a status and its proper mode of treatment
from a criminal offense in the famous passage that follows:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make
it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted
with a venereal disease. A State might determine that the general health and
welfare require that the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt
with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestra-
tion. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. ...
We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same category.
Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted).
50. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The conviction was for being intoxi-
cated in a public place, which Powell claimed was either symptomatic of or com-
pelled by his alcoholism.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides in part: "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ......
52. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (burden of proof in juvenile proceeding).
53. Id. at 364. This holding was foreshadowed by the opinion of the first Justice
Harlan in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (jury instructed to convict
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Wilbur 54 to void Maine's statutory requirement 55 that the defendant
prove that he acted "in the heat of passion" once the State proved an
unlawful, intentional killing, in order to preclude a conviction for
murder rather than voluntary manslaughter. In essence, the trial
judge instructed the jury that if it were satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant Wilbur had committed a voluntary and inten-
tional killing, malice -aforethought was presumed. Therefore, the de-
fendant would be guilty of murder unless he established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he had killed in the heat of passion
upon a sudden provocation. In such a case, the jury could find him
guilty of manslaughter. 56
Since the Mullaney decision various states have experimented with
the presumptions and burdens of proof required under their criminal
codes. 57 Recently, the Court decided that the Winship-Mullaney
concept did not invalidate a New York murder conviction obtained
under the presumption that where the state proved an intentional
defendant in murder case when evidence was equally balanced regarding the sanity
of the accused). Morano, writing in 1975, suggested that before the development of
the reasonable doubt rule jurors were expected to acquit if they had any doubts,
reasonable or unreasonable, of the accused's guilt. Morano, A Reexamination of the
Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U.L. REV. 507, 519 (1975). He
notes, as I have suggested earlier (see note 19 supra, and accompanying text), that
the standard evidently developed from the reasonable man doctrine which appeared
in eighteenth century tort cases in response to the need for a rational system of proof
in which only relevant and probative information could be the basis for the jury's
determinations. Morano, supra, at 514. Winship and subsequent cases seem to have
enshrined this minimal evidentiary requirement into a constitutional rule.
54. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Two excellent discussions of the subject of presump-
tions, one before and one following Mullaney, can be found in Ashforth & Singer,
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); and Com-
ment, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Bur-
den of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871 (1976). See also
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968); Osenbaugh, The Constitution-
ality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976).
55. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964).
56. 421 U.S. at 704. See generally, Comment, Due Process and Supremacy as
Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism after Wilbur v. Mul-
laney, 26 ME. L. REV. 37 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Evans v. Maryland, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975); United
States v. Bethea, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976). For a comprehensive analysis of
Mullaney's impact on affirmative defenses, see Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of
Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976). It has been
suggested that in view of the British tradition followed in the United States until
1950 and Mullaney, duress and coercion are not true affirmative defenses. Comment,
Constitutionality of Criminal Affirmative Defenses: Duress and Coercion, 11 U.S.F.
L. REV. 123, 129-69 (1976).
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killing (with death, causation, and intention)5 8 it could sustain a
charge of first degree murder unless the defendant could show that
he suffered "extreme emotional disturbance." 5 9  This case may indi-
cate the continued vitality of Leland v. Oregon,60 decided in 1952, in
which the Court upheld a conviction based upon a statute requiring
defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.6 ' Many
states now require defendant merely to produce evidence of his in-
sanity, which must then be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt by
the prosecution.6 2
In a recent antitrust case,6 3 the Court declined to hold that the
prosecution's burden of proof could be relieved by a presumption
58. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
59. Id. at 222 n.5.
60. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
61. Id. at 799.
In his concurring opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968), Justice
Black wrote that for the Court to require a defense of compulsive behavior caused by
disease would be to make a form of the insanity defense a constitutional requirement
throughout the nation, and overrule Leland, where both the majority and dissenting
opinions stressed the indefensibility of imposing a particular test of criminal responsi-
bility on the States.
In Mullaney, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, concurring, expressed
their understanding that the decision did not call into question the ruling in Leland
with respect to the proof of insanity. Subsequently, the court confirmed that it re-
mained constitutional to require the defendant to prove his insanity defense, dismis-
sing as not raising a substantial federal question a case in which appellant specifically
challenged the continuing validity of Leland. Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877
(1976), dismissing for want of substantial federal question, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976).
The claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and
Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial federal ques-
tion. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
We are unwilling to reconsider Leland and and Rivera.
... Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been con-
stitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this
case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). The United States thus apparently
retains the insanity defense and related statutory defenses as "affirmative defenses."
62. See, e.g., Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), dismissing for want of
substantial federal question, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440
Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970). But see Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 559 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1977). The MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.12(2) Proposed Off. Draft, 1962,
provides:
(2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:
(a) require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there
is evidence supporting such defense; or
(b) apply to any defense which the Code or another statute plainly re-
quires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence.
63. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 Sup. Ct. 2864 (1978).
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that, once unlawful price-fixing 64 effects were shown, 65 probable
anti-competitive consequences followed. Evidentiary inferences are
permissible,6 6 but not departures from the Mullaney proof require-
ments of elements of the offense charged.
IV. BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED-Regina v.
Morgan AND United States v. Short
Great Britain has avoided the apparent contradiction posed by the
imposition of an objective standard on the normally subjective crimi-
nal law. Furthermore, it has done so without the aid of a constitu-
tional requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This has oc-
curred in spite of a strong tradition, again originating with America's
Justice Holmes, of objectivity in other areas of criminal law, as illus-
trated by the well-known cases of Bedder v. Director of Public Pro-
secutions 67 and Director of Prosecutions v. Smith. 68
In Regina v. Morgan,69 a group of R.A.F. men went drinking with
Morgan, their superior officer. They then endeavored to find prosti-
tutes, and were unsuccessful. Morgan finally suggested that they all
adjourn to his home to have sexual intercourse with his wife. The
defendants' story was that on the way home he informed the young
men that his wife was "kinky," enjoying perverse pleasures including
64. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
65. 98 Sup. Ct. at 2872.
66. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden of Per-
suasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
67. [1854] All E.R. 801, where defendant, an impotent man, killed a prostitute
who jeered at him, and was denied the partial defense of provocation. The provoca-
tion must be such as would arouse a reasonable ordinary man, as opposed to a
reasonable impotent man, to violence. "If the reasonable man is then deprived in
whole or in part of his reason or the normal man endowed with abnormal characteris-
tics, the test ceases to have any value." The decision is criticized in Williams, Provo-
cation and the Reasonable Man, CIM. L. REV. 740, 741-42 (1954).
68. [1960] 3 All E.R. 161, 167, [1961] A.C. 290 where defendant accelerated his
car, causing a policeman to fall into the path of an oncoming car, and was convicted
of first degree murder, although he had no intent to kill:
On the assumption that he is so accountable for his actions, the sole question is
whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous bodily
harm was the natural and probable result. The only test available for this is
what the ordinary responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the case,
have contemplated as the natural and probable result. (emphasis added).
The Court refers to HOLMES, supra note 18, at 53. The Court adopted the reason-
able man standard, 3 All E.R. at 169-70. The case was in effect overruled by the
Criminal Justice Act 1967, 8 Eliz. 2, c. 80, pt. 1, § 8. See Williams, Constructive
Malice Revived, 23 MOD. L. REV. 605 (1960); Kenny, Intent and Purpose in Law, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 146 ff. (Summers ed. 1972).
69. 2 W.L.R. 913 (H.L. 1975).
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the thought that she was being raped. She would therefore struggle
and scream, but the men should take this apparent resistance as a
sign that she was enjoying herself. When the men reached the Mor-
gan home, they dragged Mrs. Morgan, who for some time had slept
apart from her husband, into another room, and forced her to have
intercourse with each one of them in turn, including her husband,
while the others held her down, over her violent screams and strug-
gles. 70
At the trial the charge required that defendants' mistake of fact be
both real and reasonable. The court held that it is not enough that a
defendant relied upon a belief, even though honestly held, if it was
completely fanciful and contrary to every indication which would
carry some weight with a reasonable man. 71 All except Morgan were
convicted of rape. Morgan, who by law could not be guilty of rape of
his wife, 72 was convicted of aiding and abetting. 73
On appeal the House of Lords upheld the convictions, but not on
the basis of the defendants' lack of reasonableness. 74  The English
jurists did not believe, and felt that jury properly instructed could not
believe, that the defendants had really entertained such a mistake. 75
Mistake of fact, genuine but unreasonable, would have negated the
intent required for the crime of rape. 76 "If the defendant believed
(even on unreasonable grounds) that the woman was consenting to
70. Id. at 956.
71. Id. at 940 (Opinion of L. Edmund-Davis).
72. Sexual Offenses Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 1.
73. 2 W.L.R. at 915.
74. Id. at 926, 937, 938, 959.
75. The court below (Bridge, J.) wrote that the jury obviously considered the
men's story "a pack of lies and one must assume that any other jury would have
taken the same view of the relative credibility of the parties." Id. at 926.
76. See, e.g., opinion of Lord Hailsham of St. Marylbone, id. at 931. See G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 184. Lord Hailsham criticized the use by some of the
minority Lords of definitions and explanations of mens rea found in offenses other
than rape. 2 W.L.R. at 915 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 173. Lord Hailsham
wrote that it was wrong to utilize the reasoning found in "strict liability" offenses of
bigamy and statutory rape to arrive at a conclusion that defendants might be found
guilty of forcible rape without an intent requirement as to the circumstances of the
offense. Even though the offense of rape might require purpose (or knowledge) as to
its actus reus, or conduct, and its result, again the act of sexual intercourse, the
intent requirement for the material element might well be quite different (i.e., reck-
lessness). See also Wechsler, On Culpability and Crime: The Treatment of Mens
Rea in the Model Penal Code, 339 ANNALS 24, 28 (1963). "The Model Penal Code
thus recognizes that the kind of culpability required by the law may not only vary
from crime to crime within these limits but also from one to another material ele-
ment of the offense . ... "
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intercourse then he could not have been carrying out an intention to
have intercourse without her consent." 77
One of the opinions discussed the "probative" burden defined in
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions,78 noting that the
trend towards objectivity was a course which he was extremely reluc-
tant to adopt. To allow the prosecution to prove the ultimate question
of the presence of any element of a crime by less than "beyond a
reasonable doubt" was undesirable.
The dissenting judges in Morgan wrote that the new rule went too
far, allowing victims of "general intent" crimes to suffer at the ex-
pense of allowing "unreasonable" defendants to remain unpunished
for their actions. Lord Simon of Glaisdale succinctly expressed this
public policy: "A respectable woman who has been ravished would
hardly feel that she was vindicated by being told that her assailant
77. 2 W.L.R. at 958 (L. Fraser of Tullybelton) following the decision in Morgan,
Parliament enacted the Sexual Offenses Act of 1976, effective December 22, 1976,
which defined the offense of rape as "having unlawful sexual intercourse with a
woman without her consent, or reckless as to whether she consents to it." Subsection
(2) is a declaratory provision applying whenever the jury at a trial for rape has to
consider whether the defendant made a mistake of fact concerning the woman's con-
sent at the time of the alleged offense. It emphasizes that the presence or absence of
reasonable grounds for an alleged belief in the woman's consent is merely a factor
which the jury is to take into account with other relevant evidence in considering
whether the accused in fact had such a belief. See generally 126 NEW L.J. 1186
(1976). Weschler, the Reporter for the American Model Penal Code, notes that reck-
lessness may be sufficient (as may be negligence in some cases) on questions of con-
sent, as opposed to the purpose to effect the sexual relation, in rape cases. Wechsler,
supra note 76, at 28. Recklessness involves conscious risk creation on the part of the
actor. Id. at 29.
78. [1935] A.C. 462. This is the basis of the modern English view concerning
burden of proof. Here the court allowed the appeal of a murder case where the
charge had been that once the fact of killing was proved by the Crown, all cir-
cumstances of accident, necessity or infirmity were to be proved by the prisoner
unless they arose out of the evidence produced by the State. Id. at 472. The court
noted that:
Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to
be see, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject
to what I have already said as to the defense of insanity and subject also to any
statutory exception.
Id. at 481. The Butler Commission on Mentally Abnormal Offenders has recom-
mended replacing the burden of proof in such cases as Woolinington, and calls excep-
tions to the general rule with an evidential burden, or burden of production. See
generally Williams, Intoxication and Specific Intent, 126 NEW L.J. 658 (1976); Wil-
liams, Murder-Drunkeness-Insane and Non-Insane Automatism, CAMB. L.J. 3,
5-6 (1962). Compare the Woolmington view with that of the American judiciary:
This presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence
with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of
the crime. Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised by the
judiciary.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 265 (1952).
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must go unpunished because he believed, quite unreasonably, that
she was consenting to sexual intercourse." 79 The Morgan dissenters,
in addition to policy-based reasoning, continued to distinguish be-
tween crimes of specific, or ulterior intent, and those of general in-
tent, or intention merely to do the actus reas. 80 The majority in
Morgan appeared willing to abandon the distinction entirely and to
require actual knowledge or at least recklessness as elements of all
crimes. 81
However, the recent case of Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Majewski 82 suggests that the distinction has not been lost to the
British criminal law. Majewski was convicted of assault occasioning
actual bodily harm and assault on police constables in the exercise of
their duty; both are general intent crimes. The evidence indicated
that, though under the influence of drink and drugs, he knew what
he was doing. The trial judge instructed the jury that the fact that
defendant was under the influence of drugs was no defense to charges
not involving specific intent.
Majewski was convicted and his appeal was dismissed. Lord Chan-
cellor Elwyn-Jones wrote the opinion:
In the case of these offences (not requiring specific intent) it is no ex-
cuse in the law that, because of drink or drugs which the accused him-
self had taken knowingly and willingly, he had deprived himself of the
ability to exercise self-control, to realize the possible consequences of
what he was doing, or even to be conscious that he was doing it.8 3
The Lord Chancellor in Majewski quoted with approval Lord Simon's
statement in Morgan that "crimes of basic intent are those whose
79. 2 W.L.R. at 940 (L. Simon, dissenting).
80. Id. at 935 (L. Simon, dissenting). These concepts are discussed in connection
with the American development of mens rea. See notes 2-7 infra, and accompanying
text.
81. Id. at 925 (Opinion of L. Cross); id. at 933 (Opinion of L. Hailsham); id. at
949-50 (Opinion of L. Fraser). Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). In the case
of rape, since the mental element is not specified in MODEL PENAL CODE § 213, a
mistake of fact would excuse if not made recklessly, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.04(1)(a).
A similar approach was used by the court in D.P.P. v. Flannery and Prendergast
[1969] V.R. 31 where a rape conviction was quashed since:
[o]ne of the elements to he established on a charge of rape is an intention on
the part of the accused to have carnal knowledge without the consent of the
woman concerned, and that this involves proof by the crown either that the
accused was aware that the woman was not consenting, or else realized that she
might not be and determined to have intercourse with her whether she was
consenting or not. Id. at 32. See Elliott, Australian Letter, 1969 CRIM. L.
REV. 511, 515. Defendant still bears the evidential burden, or burden of pro-
duction, however.
82. [1976] 2 All E.R. 142.
83. Id. at 172.
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definition expresses (or more often implies) a mens rea which does
not go beyond the actus reus." He failed, however, to note that Lord
Simon's view was rejected by a majority of the House of Lords.8 4
The Majewski decision is based on sound reasoning and its results
well serve the ends of justice. 85 In contrast, American case law does
not provide such excellent precedent. The leading American case, in
which both the facts and the results were strikingly similar to those in
Majewski, was unfortunately decided on the basis of the indefensible
doctrine requiring a showing of reasonableness in mistake of fact de-
fenses.
United States v. Short, 86 took place during the Korean War in the
city of Tokyo. Private Short and a companion, both of whom had
apparently been drinking, approached two Japanese women from be-
hind. When one woman attempted to run, frightened by the
English-speaking men, the other tripped and was caught by Short.
He spoke to her in English; but, although she had learned some En-
glish in school, she was so afraid that she did not understand what
was said, except that there was some mention of yen. Short then
pulled her into a public latrine, closed the door, and fondled her
while she protested loudly in Japanese. Short later claimed that he
thought that the victim was a prostitute and was disagreeing only
about the price offered for her services. In the meantime, her com-
panion returned to the latrine with the victims employer, who
opened the door, heard the victim saying "no" in Japanese, and saw
Short holding her. The employer then summoned the police who,
upon arriving on the scene, called out in Japanese for Short to stop.
Short replied in the same language that everything was all right. He
84. See Williams, Intoxication and Specific Intent, 126 NEw L.J. 658, 659-70
(1976), for a discussion of the case. Williams would no doubt approve of the majority
decision in Morgan, at least for offenses not deemed "strict liability" like bigamy,
which purport to do away with all but the voluntary act requirement. Williams notes
that this might make intoxication a defense in all crimes where defendant did not
know what he was doing, and therefore suggested a separate offense of dangerous
intoxication. Williams, The Mental Element in Crime, 125 NEW L.J. 968, 969-70
(1975). Such an act seems to have been codified as part of the proposed Mentally
Abnormal Offenders Act, Cmd. 6244 of 1975. There it would be a strict liability
offense.
85. The logic of the British position does not in any way reflect upon my own or
the modern judicial or legislative position regarding the offense of rape. Anyone who
forces a woman against her will to submit to other men can go to prison, even if
those other men get the benefit of the Morgan rule. Regina v. Cogan and Leak,
[1975] 2 All E.R. 1059.
86. 4 C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954).
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was thereupon arrested, and ultimately convicted of assault with in-
tent to commit rape 87 by a general court martial in Japan.88
When the case reached the Court of Military Appeals, review was
granted to consider the denial of defense requests for several specific
instructions.8 9  The one of concern here is proffered instruction
number two:
In order to constitute an offense, the accused must think the victim is
not consenting because he must intend not only to have carnal knowl-
edge of the woman but to do so by force. 90
Short maintained that he sought to present a defense of mistake of
fact. He cited an Alabama case where a rape conviction was reversed
because the trial judge failed to give what Short felt was a similar
instruction. The requested instruction in the Alabama case focused on
the "honest and reasonable belief" that the prosecutrix, who in that
case was weakminded, had consented. 91
Short's conviction was affirmed, 92 the court noting that the omis-
sion of "reasonable" in the charge he requested was substantial but
87. Id. at 441, 16 C.M.R. at 15. Rape is generally considered a "general intent"
crime-the actor must intend merely to have intercourse with a woman by force and
against her will. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114, 119 (9th Cir. 1970),
modified, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971); Com-
ment, Rape-Specific or General Intent Crime?, 15 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 128
(1958). Interestingly enough it is the only such crime that supports a conviction for
felony murder, where theoretically the specific intent necessary to raise the degree of
the homicide to first degree murder is derived from the specific intent proved for the
underlying offense. See note 9 supra.
88. 4 C.M.A. at 439, 16 C.M.R. at 13.
89. Id. at 440, 16 C.M.R. at 14.
90. Id. at 441, 16 C.M.R. at 15.
91. Id. at 444-45, 16 C.M.R. at 18-19, citing McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So.
775 (1888). See also State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444, 390 P.2d 759 (1964). The
McQuirk charge, 84 Ala. at 437, 4 So. at 776, was reported by the appeals court as
follows:
The fourth charge requested by the defendant should also have been given.
The consent given by the prosecutrix may have been implied as well as express,
and the defendant would be justified in assuming the existence of such consent
if the conduct of the prosecutrix towards him... was of such a nature as to
create in his mind the honest and reasonable belief that she had consented by
yielding her will freely to the commission of the act.
An example of a recent similar case is People v. Maybury, 15 Cal. 3d 449, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337 (1975). At trial the "reasonable mistake of fact" charge was
omitted, resulting in defendant's conviction of rape where his victim's conduct had
been truly equivocal. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
necessary to give the requested charge.
92. 4 C.M.A. at 445, 16 C.M.R. at 19. One gets the feeling that the same result
might have been reached under the doctrine in Morgan, see note 76 supra, either by
[Vol. 2
MISTAKE OF FACT DEFENSE
that the trial judge was correct in refusing it, because "It]he accused's
personal evaluation of the circumstances is but one factor to be consid-
ered by the court; it is not conclusive." 93
The dissent in Short focused on the difference between the general
intent crime of rape, where reasonableness might be needed for a
valid defense of mistake of fact; and the specific intent crime of as-
sault with intent to commit rape, where defendant should be entitled
to an instruction on mistake of fact regardless of reasonableness. 94
Hypothetically at least, had the court accepted the defense argument
the results might have been different, since Short maintained that his
mistake, although possibly unreasonable, was an honest one. He
might on the other hand, still have been convicted if the trier of fact
found that he was criminally reckless when he made the mistake. 95
Short was intoxicated. Therefore, even if he believed the woman was
consenting (a doubtful fact, since from the testimony he evidently
spoke some Japanese), his belief in her consent would have been
deemed reckless. He would still have been found guilty.
V. CONCLUSION
The contrast between the approaches taken in Morgan and Short
thus illustrate a failure in America's otherwise enlightened criminal
justice formulations. American courts could remedy the situation by
eliminating the "reasonableness" requirement in mistake of fact cases,
either for reasons of logic or because the due process requirements of
the Constitution require them to do so. American legislatures (or
applying a recklessness standard, as was impliedly done.inl Morgan, see note 81
supra, or by considering Short guilty because his act was malum in se. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1120 (1977) (mistake of law); Regina v. Prince, 2 Crim. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). Cf.
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975).
93. 4 C.M.A. at 445, 16 C.M.R. at 19.
94. Id. at 446-47, 16 C.M.R. at 21. In making this distinction, Judge Brosman
comes very near to the opinion of Lord Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting in Morgan, 2
W.L.R. at 937, see note 79 supra.
95. See Wechsler, On Culpability and Crime: The Treatment of Mens Rea in the
Model Penal Code, 339 ANNALS 24, 34 (1963); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2): "When
recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been
sober, such awareness is immaterial." Wechsler notes that the policy of the provision
is that "awareness of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity
of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is so dispersed in our
culture that it is fair to postulate a general equivalence-in respect to culpability-
between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and his conduct in
becoming drunk." See, e.g., Springfield v. State 96 Ala. 81, 85-86, 11 So. 250, 252
(1892).
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courts construing the mens rea requirements of particular statutes)
could alternatively resolve the problem by enacting general intent
crimes requiring recklessness, instead of unreasonableness, as a
minimum standard for conviction.
The Supreme Court has recently stated that its concern is with
what the defendant actually thought and did, rather than the question
of whether a procedural mistake was made at his arrest or trial.9 6 The
Court continues to find that "it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free." . 9 7 Due process only requires
that the balance be struck in favor of the defendant. It does not re-
quire that "every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost" to
limit the chances that the innocent might be convicted.98 Therefore,
it cannot be said that the Court is placing an impossible burden on
the State.
It seems just as unconstitutional to relax the prosecution's burden
of proof in mistake of fact cases as it is in the "heat of passion" situa-
tion considered in Mullaney. It is indeed ironic that American courts
appear more willing to punish rather than to acquit a person who is
unfortunate, but guilty of no crime, than they are to mitigate the
penalty for one who is conceivably guilty of some offense. 99 Excuses
developed in the law of homicide prior to mitigating factors, 100 an
96. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is only a prophylactic tool and should not apply to federal habeas corpus
once reviewed in state court of alleged search and seizure); with United States v.
Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975):
[T]here may well be circumstances in which ignorance of the official status of the
person assaulted or resisted negates the very existence of mens rea. For example,
where an officer fails to identify himself or his purpose, his conduct in certain
circumstances might reasonably be interpreted as the unlawful use of force di-
rected either at the defendant or his property. In a situation of that kind, one
might be justified in exerting an element of resistance, and an honest mistake of
fact would not be consistent with criminal intent.
and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (the issue of entrapment can
only be raised when defendant has no predisposition to commit the crime in ques-
tion); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-09 (1971) (affirming conviction for
possession of unregistered hand grenade; conduct of accused not likely to be inno-
cent).
97. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
99. See generally the discussion of mitigation as opposed to justification and ex-
cuse in H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 123-39 (1968); H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-28 (1968).
100. Perhaps the earliest discussions of excuse are found in the Bible: "Whoever
strikes a man so that he dies shall be put to death. But if he did not lie in wait for
him, but God let him fall into his hand, then I will appoint for you a place to which
he may flee." Exodus 21:12-13.
This is the provision for the manslayer, who by fleeing there may save his
life. If any one kills his neighbor unintentionally without having been at enmity
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indication, perhaps, of the court's traditional unwillingness to punish
an accused in the absence of moral culpability. At any rate, there can
hardly be a finding of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" where in fact
defendant did not know that he was doing harm.
with him in time past-as when a man goes into the forest with his neighbor to
cut wood, and his hand swings the axe to cut down a tree, and the head slips
from the handle and strikes his neighbor so that he dies-he may flee to one of
these cities and save his life; lest the avenger of blood in hot anger pursue the
manslayer and overtake him, because the way is long, and wound him mortally,
though the man did not deserve to die, since he was not at enmity with his
neighbor in time past. Therefore I command you, You shall set apart three
cities.
Deuteronomy 19:4-7. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *190-93; 198-201 also
makes a distinction between murder and manslaughter. The division between first
and second degree murder came still later. See, e.g., Act of April 22, 1794, § 2, 15
Stat. at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801 ch. 1777, at 174-75 (1911); People v.
Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) (establishing di-
minished capacity in certain cases). See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 1-28 (1968).
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